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A SENSE OF PROPORTION AND 
A SENSE OF PRIORITIES: 
REFLECTIONS ON THE REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON CANADIAN UNITY 
J. STEFAN DUPRI* PAUL C. WEILERt 
Cambridge,Mass. 
I. Introduction. 
The elegantly written Report of the Task Force on Canadian Unity ' is 
the most recent product of our constitutional reform industry. In 
many respects it is the most impressive. It deserves attention if for no 
other reason than the make-up of the group which produced it. The 
Task Force was composed of both men and women, politicians and 
scholars, persons with experience in the business community and in 
the union movement, and representatives of each of our far-flung 
regions. Its co-chairmen, Jean-Luc Pepin and John Robarts, are two 
of the most experienced and respected public figures in Canada. The 
Commissioners toured the entire country. They listened patiently to 
often vehement expressions of opinion about Canadian federalism. 
At the end of that exercise in constitutional consciousness-raising-
intrinsically valuable in its own right-they emerged with a 
unanimous Report. 
And yet, at least to the two of us, the Report is something of a 
disappointment. The Task Force does paint a vivid picture of the 
unhappiness that so many Canadians genuinely feel about their lot 
within Confederation. It marshalls a formidable array of constitu-
tional recommendations, just about each of which has the respecta-
bility of having been endorsed by one authority or other. What we 
missed, though, was a detached scrutiny of the current validity of the 
litany of complaints. We also missed a critical appraisal of whether 
the many constitutional proposals are really responsive to our current 
straits. What Canadians most need in our current round of 
navel-gazing about Canadian federalism is a sense of proportion 
about Confederation discontents and a sense of priorities about 
constitutional reform. These we did not receive from the Task Force 
on Canadian Unity. Admitting to what were "at times, sharp 
* J. Stefan Dupr6, Mackenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies, Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
t Paul C. Weiler, Mackenzie King Professor of Canadian Studies, Harvard Law 
School, Cambridge, Mass. 
1The Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together: Observations and 
Recommendations (Jan. 1979), hereinafter cited as Report. 
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disagreement", 2 the Task Force appears to have opted to compile an 
encyclopedia of constitutional reforms rather than separate the wheat 
from the chaff. 
Such critical notices for this Report might not be terribly 
important taken by themselves. This document may pass from the 
scene, just as did the Liberal government which commissioned its 
authors. What stirs us to write this review essay is our growing 
conviction that much the same judgment is i propos of so many of 
the blueprints for a new Canada which have appeared on the 
landscape since November 15th, 1976. 3 Like so many others, the 
Task Force Commissioners felt a profound urge to design a new,
"renewed federalism" before the Quebec referendum whose time is 
now being counted down. We think it high time that our constitu-
tional chefs stopped adding more and more dishes to our menu. 
Some serious questions must be posed about the entire exercise. Are 
our current troubles really attributable to our existing constitutional 
arrangements? Will a massive rewriting of the British North America 
Act 4 really cure them? And if we do feel compelled to make some 
changes-if only as a gesture of good faith to the federalist forces 
inside Quebec-upon which of the items now on the agenda should 
we place our bets? 
II. Confederationand its Discontents. 
The nature of the current Canadian Disease has become only too 
familiar by repetition. As the Task Force put it, Canada is passing 
through a crisis of its very existence, of which the election of the 
Partiqu~bcois is just a symbol. These are the major tensions from 
which the country seems to be drifting apart: 
1. First is the centuries-old cultural dualism between French 
and English Canada which has attained a qualitatively different 
dimension since the modernisation of Quebec took hold with the 
Quiet Revolution. Forces of urbanization, industrialization, mass 
education, and secularization have eroded the traditional institutions 
of Church, parish, and rural community. For reasons of history, 
language, law, ethnicity, collective feelings and political action, 
Qu bcois of every description hold that it is the Province of Quebec 
2 Report, p. 118. 
Among the other documents now in the public domain are Canada West 
Foundation, Alternatives: Towards the Development of an Effective Federal System 
for Canada (March 1978); Ontario Advisory Committee on Confederation, First 
Report (April 1978); Government of Canada, A Time for Action: Toward the Renewal 
of the Canadian Federation (July 1978); Canadian Bar Association Committee on the 
Constitution, Towards a New Canada (Aug. 1978); Government of British Columbia, 
British Columbia's Constitutional Proposals (Sept. 1978). 
4 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, as am. (U.K.), hereinafter cited as B.N.A. Act. 
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which now bears the vocation of nurturing the French fact in North 
America. 
2. Added to what is now a full-fledged Qu~bicois nationalism 
is a resurgence of regional identification and aspiration in the rest of 
Canada. The illusion of many Quebeckers notwithstanding, English 
Canada has never been a monolithic and homogeneous entity. In 
recent years, the traditional sources of diversity-geography, 
history, economics, and ethnicity-have reasserted themselves with 
a vengeance, increasingly articulated by the provinces. Many 
provincial governments have emulated the aggressiveness of Quebec 
in the Sixties in promoting their own regional economies and 
societies, and have become bitterly resentful of what they perceive 
as federal intrusion upon their plans and prerogatives. 
3. At the best of times, a combination of these two centrifugal 
forces would pose an intractable challenge to Canadian unity. A 
further complication is the ailing Canadian economy. The sluggish 
stagflation which has afflicted the entire industrial world in the 
Seventies sharply restricts our freedom of maneuvre. As the Task 
Force notes, "we can no longer hope to buy our way out of our 
difficulties". 5This circumstance helps to detract from the authority 
of our national government which is popularly held responsible for 
our economic well-being. Indeed Ottawa, the Task Force found in its 
travels, "is for many Canadians synonymous with all that is to be 
deplored about modern government-a remote, shambling bureauc-
racy that extracts tribute from its subjects and gives little in return" .6 
The Task Force captures the centrifugal forces that are abroad in 
Canada about as eloquently and as economically as anyone. To them 
the implications of their analysis seem all too clear. The legitimate 
aspirations of all the regions, in particular Quebec, are being stifled 
by a century-old British North America Act, drafted in a more 
centralizing era, and now contributing-or so the Task Force 
suggests-to the arrogance of power in an alien Ottawa. A radically 
restructured federalism seems like the only answer. 
Yet, as we observed at the outset, it is high time we began 
viewing these complaints with a sense of proportion. Let us illustrate 
what we mean from the case of Western Canada. In the first place, 
we believe it was a mistake for the Task Force to subsume Western 
Canadian alienation under an undifferentiated sense of English 
Canadian regionalism. Within English Canada, Western feelings are 
distinctive and politically explosive. The West has its own history, 
its own multi-ethnic make-up (neither British nor French in 
character), its own industrial structure and political attitudes. 
Report, p. 16. 
6 
Ibid. 
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Historically the West has a long list of economic grievances 
stemming from its quasi-colonial relationship with the metropolitan 
axis of Central Canada. To be sure, a lot of the Western case is 
spongy under skeptical economic analysis. Perhaps there is no better 
illustration than the time-honoured complaints about the impact of 
transportation policy, as some excellent recent work is beginning to 
show. I By any yardstick it is the Atlantic provinces which have the 
better title to complain about the benefits of an economic union 
dominated by "the Empire of the St. Lawrence", to use Creighton's 
evocative phrase. 8 
But it is Alberta and British Columbia, not Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, that are calling for radical constitutional change. 
Western Canada is increasingly distinguishable from Atlantic 
Canada in that the roots of Western discontent lie not in ritualisti-
cally repeated grievances, but in the sense of power that commands 
an audience. Alberta is unquestionably the richest governmental 
jurisdiction in North America. British Columbia and Saskatchewan 
aspire to being not far behind. The current population of the Western 
provinces rivals that of Quebec and promises to outstrip the latter 
comfortably by the turn of the century. With people and wealth, the 
quest for political power follows close behind. The lesson of history 
is that those who previously were weak but have grown strong 
become impatient that "their reach now exceeds their grasp", and 
chafe under restraints they previously considered inevitable. That is 
what happened to Quebec in the Sixties. The same sentiment is 
abroad in Western Canada now. Not only is the West thus different 
from Atlantic Canada; there is an element in Western alienation that 
is comparable to the Quebec scene ven though linguistic dualism 
unquestionably makes Quebec unique. 
There is no better illustration than the coincidence of Quebec's 
Bill 101 and Alberta's Heritage Fund. The former is provincially 
legislated affirmative action that seeks to transform the linguistic 
face of Montreal. The latter makes available a multi-billion dollar 
fund to a provincial government intent on building a secondary 
manufacturing base and expanding local financial institutions, 
devising its own forms of affirmative action to that effect. So much 
for the argument that the current constitution is not elastic enough to 
accommodate regional aspirations. There is a subtler irony as well. 
These very government measures, both of which are left open to 
Quebec City and Edmonton under the B.N.A. Act as it now stands, 
See Norrie, Western Economic Grievances: An Overview with Special 
Reference to Freight Rates, in The Political Economy of Confederation (1979), p. 
199. 
8 The Empire of the St. Lawrence (1956). 
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may well do more to allay Qugbicois and Western grievances than 
all the radical constitutional change that these grievances have led 
groups like the Task Force to espouse. 
III. The ConstitutionalLever. 
We have already taken up the primary burden of this article. Just like 
almost everyone else in the flourishing business of reforming 
Canadian federalism, the Commissioners have reached too often for 
the constitutional lever. Not only do they find things to be seriously 
wrong in Canadian federalism, they also assume that we can and 
should fix them by rewriting the British North America Act. The 
main reason we have singled out the Task Force Report for critical 
review is to stake out our claim that constitutional reform should be 
the last, not the first, lever in a strategy to deal with the sources of 
Canadian disunity. 
Ironically the Task Force itself embraces that philosophy when 
it deals with one of the most controversial issues on the current 
constitutional agenda: language policy. As is well known, Pierre 
Elliott Trudeau has devoted his public life-both scholarly and 
political-to try to establish in the Canadian constitution a funda-
mentalpersonal right to use either French or English in dealings with 
governments across Canada, a right which would bind not just 
Ottawa but also the provinces. Most important of all, that 
constitutional principle would guarantee the right of an education in 
the minority language in any area where numbers warrant it. 
The Task Force which Trudeau appointed has broken with that 
approach. A century of history has produced a situation in which 
language use and assimilation is going to be territorial in character, 
whatever a constitution might say. 9 Thus, the Commissioners argue 
that provincial governments must have the constitutional latitude to 
deal with the current facts of life about cultural dualism in Canada: in 
particular that the French fact is now overwhelmingly the Quebec 
fact. Each provincial legislature should have the right to determine 
the official language within the province. To the extent that section 
133 of the B.N.A. Act stands as a barrier to that aspiration-whether 
tangibly or symbolically-it should be deleted, not expanded. 
Not that the Task Force was insensitive to the dilemma of two 
nations, which, somehow, must be rescued from two solitudes. 
Since the Bilingualism and Biculturalism Report," major steps have 
been taken to achieve greater degrees of bilingualism among elites in 
9 See Guindon, The Modernization of Quebec and the Legitimacy of the 
Canadian State, in Glenday, Guindon, and Turowetz, eds, Modernization and the 
Canadian State (1978), p. 212. 
10Report of the Royal Commission on Biculturalism and Bilingualism (1967). 
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Canada. After all, how else can we have bilingual central institutions 
in Canada, a minimum need for a federal government which hopes to 
be legitimate in every part of the country? Having endorsed 
bilingualism in the central institutions of the federal government, the 
Task Force places its reliance on the political self-interest of 
provincial governments to see the need to provide equal linguistic 
opportunity for Canadian children to participate in these major 
institutions. In effect, the Task Force opts for a strategy of practical 
problem-solving, of statutory rights which can be tailored to the 
diversity of local situations, of intergovernmental bargaining to 
establish reciprocal language rights for citizens moving from one 
province to another; with the expectation, or at least the hope, that a 
national consensus will emerge "by appeal to the intelligence and 
the fairness of the population". Most emphatically, the Task Force 
chooses not "to brandish the club of the constitution".' 1 
This is the one setting in which the Task Force displays 
reticence about the value of constitutional cures. Indeed, having 
discarded a constitutional approach to the one fundamental right 
which figures so prominently in the question of Canadian unity, the 
Commissioners blithely go on to advise us to adopt a 
constitutionally-entrenched Bill of Rights. Here is the sum and 
substance of the argument they make to connect this proposal to their 
mandate. "There is a vital link between the protection of basic rights 
and Canadian unity. For only if Canadians feel individually and 
collectively confident of their rights can we expect them to display a 
positive attitude toward change and accommodation." 12 Further in 
the same vein, "a sense of individual and collective confidence in 
the security of their rights would contribute to a positive attitude of 
Canadian unity". 1' We would not deny that a plausible case can be 
made for putting certain basic freedoms beyond the reach of 
temporary legislative majorities. The issue is a complex one, 
requiring among other things a delicate prudential judgment about 
whether our legal and judicial culture has displayed the aptitude for 
that charge; and thus whether it merits a higher degree of trust than 
our political institutions. Surely though, there has rarely been an 
odder claim for a Bill of Rights than the one the Commissioners have 
made. 
The Task Force does not stop there. It goes on to argue for a 
thorough-going constitutionalization of our economic rights and 
freedoms. Under the heading of "Unity and the Health of the 
Economy" the Commissioners depict an environment "where there 
" Report, p. 53. 
121bid., p. 107. 
131bid., p. 108. 
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is constant haggling about which level of government is supposed to 
do what, where policies overlap and programs are duplicated, and 
where there are growing restrictions in interprovincial trade. 1 
• . . most provincial governments have developed a multitude of 
regulatory measures, have evolved practices such as preferential 
purchasing policies, quotas, and preferential pricing, and have 
established marketing boards, all of which have reduced interprovin-
cial trade and therefore the efficiency of Canada's common 
market". 15 We agree with the Task Force that the problem is there. 
We would like to have had an informed estimate from the 
Commissioners of the net loss in economic surplus from the 
restrictive provincial policies. We suspect that the aggregate 
magnitude would not be that high. Admittedly, the problem seems to 
be growing. As the example is set by one cause cO1~bre (Premier 
Bennett of British Columbia halting the take-over of MacMillan-
Bloedel by that "foreign" corporation, Canadian Pacific) other 
governments are quick to follow suit, (for instance, in the recent 
Quebec budget, Finance Minister Parizeau has proposed a tax credit 
for investment in shares of Quebec-based companies). 
Whatever the magnitude of the problem, the Task Force is bent 
on a set of constitutional remedies to enhance our economic union. 
In particular section 121 of the B.N.A. Act should be clarified in 
order to guarantee more effectively free trade between the provinces 
for all produce and manufactured goods, and be extended to include 
services. Preferential pricing policies should be permitted only in 
those cases "where the province requires them to alleviate acute 
economic hardship". 16 Impediments to interprovincial movement 
within the profession and trades should be reduced, and barriers to 
movement of capital, especially corporate mergers and purchases of 
land, should be banned by the constitution. 
Hopefully this would expand the size of the economic surplus 
generated in our common market rather than divert that surplus to 
finance constitutional itigation. On this assumption the Task Force, 
eager to insure that the surplus is more equitably distributed among 
the several regions than the free market would dictate, seeks to 
entrench in the constitution the responsibility of the central 
government for the principle of provincial revenue equalization-
now embodied in a complex network of statutory transfers. 17 
14Ibid., p. 65. 
5 Ibid., p. 70. 
6
Ibid., p. 71. 
17 Indeed the Task Force is much more ambitious than even that. Over and above 
mere equalization of standards of public services, they would make equalization of 
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With the Commissioners' economic intentions we have no 
serious quarrel. What we seriously question is the value of writing 
all of this into the constitution. Here are just a few of the questions 
which occurred to us in reading this part of the Report. 
(i) Has the experience with judicially-enforced constitutional 
guarantees of a free market been that happy in federations 
which have had them (for instance, Australia)? 
(ii) Why is rule by judges desirable for protecting the right of 
capital mobility, but not the right to education in the 
minority language? 
(iii) Is there ultimate compatibility between a free-flowing 
economic union and a territorially-based language policy? 
(iv) Should we entrench in our constitution the principle of 
equalization, and thus hamstring ourselves in making the 
adjustments which seem necessary for such sudden shocks 
as the OPEC hike in oil prices after the Yom Kippur War, 
to say nothing of a new structure of incentives which some 
economists feel must be imposed on the provinces to take 
some responsibility for tough measures to improve the 
lagging performance of their regional economies?"M 
In sum, we simply fail to see why a tack of statutory action, attuned 
to immediate practical problems, changing conditions, and diverse 
needs, one which is coordinated by reciprocal agreements achieved 
thorough executive federalism, is suitable for language policy but 
not for economic policy. The Report of the Unity Task Force makes 
no effort to tell us why. 
IV. "A RestructuredFederalism?" 
Yet all of the above is just preliminary skirmishing. The flirtation of 
the Task Force with constitutional change becomes full-blown 
social and economic opportunities between regions an objective of the Canadian 
federation. How do they propose to accomplish that? They would take half the 
revenues from non-renewable resources and distribute them as block grants to 
provinces whose economies had experienced relatively low rates of growth. The Task 
Force does not tell us whether that obligation should be constitutionalized as well, 
nor, in fact, who would pay for it and how. We are extremely dubious about this 
approach. It is one thing to prescribe equalization payments to compensate for 
measurable disparities in the fiscal capacity of provincial governments to raise 
revenue. It is quite another thing to try to equalize economic opportunities for 
individual citizens in whichever province they happen to live. Among other things, 
this would deny us the surplus which is gained from economic efficiency when 
resources are distributed in the locations where they are most productive. 
18See Courchene, Avenues of Adjustment: The Transfer System and Regional 
Disparities, in Fraser Institute, Canadian Confederation at the Crossroads: the Search 
for a Federal/Provincal Balance (1978), p. 143. 
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seduction when they present their conception of a "restructured 
federalism." Notwithstanding their disclaimer that they were not 
"primarily an advisory body on constitutional issues" 19 the Com-
missioners observe that "we share the widespread public view that 
among the requirements of Canadian unity is the fundamental 
revision of the constitutional political structure". 20 They then put 
themselves on record about virtually every issue on the constitutional 
agenda. It is not necessary for the theme of our article that we 
grapple with each of these subjects in detail. Instead we want to 
probe beneath the surface of these issues to expose and appraise the 
tacit assumptions that inspire such an enterprise, one in which, as we 
have said, the Task Force has a great many collaborators. 
The first and overriding assumption is that the future direction 
of Canadian federalism must be toward a much greater devolution of 
authority. There must be constitutional restraints placed on the 
exercise of jurisdiction in Ottawa, and a great deal more power to the 
provinces, presumably, in the eyes of the Task Force, because 
provincial governments are more sensitive to, and the prime engines 
of dualism and regionalism. 
There are a variety of paths which may be followed to that goal. 
One of them is largely symbolic. Under the original "quasi-federal" 
understanding of our constitution, the provinces were placed in a 
subordinate position to the central government just as Ottawa 
remained in a subordinate position to the Imperial government. A 
number of relics of that relationship remain in the B.N.A. Act, 
several of which have fallen into disuse. The provinces resent these 
symbols of inferior status. There seems to be no particular reason 
why we should not use this occasion to tidy up the constitution, 
complete the transformation begun by Lord Watson, and make the 
provinces equal in legal status to the federal government as they now 
are in fact. Ottawa's unilateral powers of reservation, disallowance, 
and declaration should be removed and the provinces should be 
entitled to appoint their own Lieutenant-Governors and Superior and 
County Court judges. The last might have benign side-effects on the 
evolution of a rational system of administrative justice in this 
country. The Task Force endorses this "easy" package of constitu-
tional reform. 
The ground gets a little swampier when we approach issues of 
constitutional substance: the distribution of legislative authority. 
Given the reticence with which the Government of Canada has 
approached this issue it is likely that the federally appointed Task 
Force felt unusual pressure to declare itself on the subject. The 
19 Report, p. 114. 
2 Ibid., p. 81. 
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response of the Commissioners is nothing if not energetic. It looks 
quite literally to the complete rewriting of sections 91 and 92. It 
revamps the federal spending power. It invites the discreet 
emergence of special status for Quebec. It is as exhaustive as it is 
exhausting. 
2 1 
The central thrust of the Task Force vision of a renewed 
Canadian federalism is contained in this passage which depicts the 
role they envisage for the provinces: 
We see the essential role of the provinces as being to take the main 
responsibility for the social and cultural well-being and development of their 
communities, for the development of their economies and the exploitation of 
their natural resources and for property and civil rights. This implies exclusive 
[or occasionally concurrent] jurisdiction over matters pertaining to culture, 
education, health, social services, marriage and divorce, immigration, 
manpower and training, administration of justice, natural resources including 
fisheries, regional economic development, trade within the province, consumer 
and corporate affairs, urban affairs, housing and land use, and environment. It 
implies as well corresponding powers to tax. Provincial governments should 
also have the right, as long as they abide by Ottawa's overriding foreign policy, 
to establish some relations with foreign countries and to sign treaties in matters 
coming under their jurisdiction. 22 
Not content with that range of responsibilities for all ten provinces, 
the Commissioners recommend additional powers for Quebec, the 
government responsible for the "French fact" in North America: 
21 it may be pertinent to make some observations about the style of 
constitutional draftsmanship favoured by the Task Force. Some eminent constitu-
tional lawyers had counseled against a brand new text, cut off from its moorings in 
the historic language that our judges, lawyers, and government officials have become 
accustomed to over this past century. The Task Force rejected that advice, feeling 
that our current arrangements "lack coherence and logical theme", Report, p. 91. As 
well, they ignored the suggestion that has been made that the B.N.A. Act suffered 
from the "vice of excessive particularity" in the drafting of lists of powers in 
sections 91 and 92. The Task Force wants a new Canadian constitution to allocate 
government authority among fully seven different lists. As a model for disentangling 
government jurisdiction, the Report, p. 92, offers us this draft proposal for 
immigration: 
"Thus it is now possible to envisage a distribution of responsibility such that 
the settlement and integration of immigrants is an exclusive provincial 
responsibility, selection criteria and levels of immigration to a province are 
concurrent with provincial paramountcy, recruiting of immigrants abroad and 
the admission of refugees are concurrent with central paramountcy, and 
deportation of aliens and public safety are under exclusive central jurisdic-
tion." 
The Task Force tells us that this faithfully reflects what has been achieved in 
recent years through inter-governmental negotiations. Indeed it does. We wonder 
about the wisdom of taking the outcome of executive federalism at a given point in 
time and freezing that into the constitution, leaving that provision to an unknown 
destiny in front of judges who have had little or no experience in interpreting 
federal-provincial arrangements. 
22 Report, p. 85. 
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In the case of Quebec, it should be assured of the full powers needed in the 
preservation and extension of its distinctive heritage. This would require either 
exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction, assigned to all provinces generally or to 
Quebec specifically, over such matters as language, culture, civil law, research 
and communications, as well as related power to tax and to establish some 
relations within these fields with foreign countries. 
2 3 
The Task Force proposes to protect the scope of provincial power 
from subtle federal incursions by drafting new, clear, and, as far as 
possible, exclusive jurisdictional lists. 
The bemused ordinary citizen may well wonder how devolution 
of power to the provinces will contribute to a stronger sense of 
Canadian unity. Yet most close observers of Canadian federalism 
would agree with the Task Force that a more decentralized 
federalism is inevitable-though some are not quite as enamoured of 
the prospect as others. The attitude seems to be that if we do not 
loosen the reins on these powerful regional forces, the steed might 
bolt completely. On this point the Task Force sits quite comfortably 
in the middle of the "renewed federalism" camp, flanked by Claude 
Ryan and Peter Lougheed. 
There is a logic to that decentralizing impulse, one which 
emerges clearly if we consider the situation of the Quibdcois in 
Canada. They are a distinct minority within the country as a whole. 
They now have about the same percentage of the population as at the 
time of Confederation. The declining birthrate in Quebec and the 
drift in economic activity westward means that Qugbicois can look 
forward to less than a quarter share of the Canadian population by the 
year 2000. The French Canadians have a profound sense of group 
identity and concern about the powers of the English majority fueled 
by the historic memory of such crises as the hanging of Riel, 
conscription, and the air traffic strike. 
Yet we do live in a democracy, founded on the principle of 
political equality of the individual: wherever he lives, whatever his 
race, language or creed. The institutional expression of that principle 
is the procedure of majority rule. In parliamentary government, with 
its disciplined parties, the majority really can rule. The government 
they elect can get things done, and be accountable to the majority for 
the results. In turn, that exposes a minority to a considerable threat. 
There is far less chance of building coalitions and floating alliances 
on specific issues than there is in a congressional system, in which 
political entrepreneurs can take account of the relative intensity of 
views about issues that are crucial to a smaller group. It may be 
possible to fence out some areas of minority concern, which are 
made immune from the legislative majority by being entrenched in a 
2 
1 Ibid., p. 86. 
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Bill of Rights. That is possible only for a limited number of 
"fundamental rights," and difficult even for these. And the 
Supreme Court, which has the final say about these, must itself 
surmount that hurdle of the relationship between the majority and 
minority language groups. 24 As to the vast number of day-to-day 
issues of government policy, even if the Qu~bgcois minority need 
not fear the animus of the majority, it is always exposed to the 
majority's insensitivity towards its special needs and concerns, (to 
take some random examples from recent history, the strike at Radio 
Canada, immigration from French language regions in Europe and 
Africa, and macro-economic policies in a country with sharply 
varying rates of unemployment and growth). 
25 
There has always seemed to be one natural response to that 
dilemma. While French Canadians are a minority in Canada as a 
whole, they are a majority in Quebec. They have a provincial 
government in Quebec City which they control as a majority. So let 
us assign more and more power to that level of government, to 
assuage the feeling of the Qudbcois that they are a beleaguered 
minority. Hence the drift to a more decentralized Canadian 
federalism ever since the fall of the St. Laurent regime in Ottawa and 
the election of Jean Lesage in Quebec City. 
Even abstracting for the moment from the plight of the 
Anglophone minority inside Quebec, there are evident limits to the 
erosion of central government authority as long as we are to remain a 
viable country which, presumably, is the aim of the exercise. The 
point is subtler and more far reaching than might be thought. There 
are powers that a government in Quebec City might want to exercise, 
but which it cannot wield nearly as effectively as part of a larger 
Canadian union as it could if it were governing a sovereign state of 
its own. Take immigration as an example, a subject in which the 
special Qudbecois interest is apparent. Suppose Quebec were given 
4 There can be no better testimony than the Task Force's own treatment of the 
Supreme Court. The Commissioners see it as "crucial that Quebec look upon the 
Supreme Court of Canada as a bastion for the protection of that province's 
responsibilities for a distinct heritage." Report, p. 101. To that end they propose that 
fully five out of eleven Supreme Court judges must be from Quebec (which, recall, 
contains slightly more than one-quarter of Canada's population). The Task Force 
seems to have cast about for a suitable vehicle among our national institutions to 
provide some affirmative political action for the benefit of the French Canadian 
minority, and ultimately settled on the Supreme Court as the candidate. A decent 
airing of these and other proposals for the constitutionalization of our Supreme Court 
requires an article all its own. One of us is now in the process of preparing that for 
publication elsewhere. 
" The last topic is of growing concern to French-Canadian economists; e.g. 
Fortin, Paquet, and Rabeau, Quebec in the Canadian Federation, [1977] Can. Pub. 
Ad. 588. 
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jurisdiction over immigration to try to attract a much higher 
proportion of Francophones to that region, in accordance with the 
province's cultural mission. Quebec City would establish carefully 
tailored limits and priorities to that end. But the province of Ontario 
might follow quite a different policy, opening its borders wide in 
hope of attracting a substantial influx of newcomers. Foreigners, 
seeing that and wanting to immigrate to Montreal, need simply use 
Ontario to do an end-run around the Quebec programme. (We 
assume that a minimum attribute of Canada as a single political 
entity is that a province such as Quebec could not establish 
check-points at its own border to bar interprovincial migration.) 
Thus the operation of one province's policy is always capable of 
frustrating the objectives of another as long as they are both part of 
the same larger nation. 
True, Quebec could always enter into an inter-governmental 
agreement with Ontario to co-ordinate their respective policies. This 
is a lot more difficult to do than to say, at least beyond isolated 
instances. That co-ordination would have to be secured among all ten 
provinces, each of which has its own needs and priorities, but which 
must be won over to a relatively coherent package. If and when 
initial agreement was achieved, it would be very difficult to alter it to 
adjust to changing conditions, lest the entire scheme come un-
raveled. Perhaps the major role of a national government in a federal 
system, one which exercises direct, independent authority, is that it 
can do the job of representing, compromising and welding together 
the competing interests of all of the regions of the country, at those 
many spots where they intersect. 
Of course the illustration we gave of the self-contained arena of 
immigration is writ large across the entire length and breadth of 
economic policy. Again, a minimum attribute of a modem state is 
that it has a common currency, a single foreign exchange rate, a 
central bank operating monetary policy, a common market, and a 
central fiscal policy impacting on the entire nation. The result is that 
economic disturbances originating in one region ripple through into 
the other regions which, under a federal constitution, lack the key 
economic tools to insulate themselves. We live in an era in which our 
economic pain threshold is low. Governments are bombarded with 
cries for relief from high unemployment and high inflation. That puts 
Ottawa under inexorable pressure to maintain, even to extend the 
reach of its economic levers, to try to pilot our balky economy in an 
increasingly stormy world. An action that only a national govern-
ment can take is to protect the citizens of some provinces from the 
harmful spillover effect (for instance, unemployment in factories in 
Ontario and Quebec) of economic initiatives taken in other provinces 
by governments responsible only for the interests of their own 
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citizens (for instance, Alberta and'Saskatchewan raising the price of 
oil and gas). 
There is a possible route out of that dilemma. Why not give 
Quebec alone those additional powers? After all, Quebec, as the 
home of the vast majority of French Canadians, is the only province 
with a special linguistic vocation. The other provinces making up 
English Canada can continue to live under a powerful Parliament. As 
long as negotiations can be confined to the bilateral level between 
Ottawa and Quebec City, there will be no great difficulties in 
co-ordinating and adjusting policies (as the example of old age 
security appears to demonstrate). That is the route of "special 
status" for Quebec, so popular among constitutional elites in the 
Sixties. 
Unfortunately, in the real world rarely are we allowed to have 
our cake and eat it too. Many people believe there are serious 
problems with the concept of special status, both in principle and in 
practice. As Prime Minister Trudeau was so fond of reminding us, 
there is only a limited degree of special authority which can feasibly 
be conferred on a regional government as long as we pretend to have 
a single national government responsive to citizens everywhere in 
the country. If Quebec City is setting policy on immigration, 
communications, regional economic development, social security, 
and so on for the Qu bcois, eventually the people in the rest of the 
country will put the uncomfortable question. By what title do 
Quebeckers elect and send to Ottawa Members of Parliament who 
help set those policies only for the rest of us-perhaps as the Cabinet 
Minister responsible, or even as Prime Minister? 
As if in empirical confirmation of that thesis, the Seventies has 
brought home the fact that cultural dualism between French and 
English Canada is not the only cleavage in Confederation. There is 
an increasingly clear divergence between the economic interests of 
Western Canada and those of Central Canada. Much more consis-
tently than French Canadians, Westerners have been in a political 
minority in Ottawa. As a self-perceived economic minority, they 
now feel much the same impulse as the linguistic minority to build up 
the authority of the provincial governments that they control. 
Whatever differences there may be about the details of constitutional 
proposals, there is one profound sentiment shared throughout 
Western Canada. If Quebec wins substantially greater authority in a 
new constitution to renew Canadian federalism, the West will want 
much the same deal for itself. 
The Task Force does make a heroic effort to rehabilitate the 
special status option, under the rubric of an "asymmetric 
federalism". The Commissioners remind us that there are fundamen-
tal differences between the size and capacity of a province such as 
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Prince Edward Island and that of Quebec, and that Quebec has 
always been treated somewhat differently under the B.N.A. Act (for 
instance, in language guarantees under section 133 or in the 
immunity of its civil law from the uniformity provision in section 
94). The Commissioners feel that Quebec does need special powers 
.,over such matters as culture, language, immigration, social policy, 
communications and some aspects of international affairs" to protect 
and develop its distinctive culture and heritage. They warn that "any 
political solution short of this would lead to the rupture of 
Canada". 26 But the Task Force does not propose to offer these 
law-making powers to Quebec alone, and deny them to the other 
provinces. That might imply a "privileged" and "favoured" 
treatment for Quebeckers. Instead these additional powers would all 
beformally available to all the provinces, but under a framework of 
interdelegation and concurrency with provincial paramountcy within 
which English-speaking provinces would not need to exercise them. 
Hopefully these areas would then remain within the jurisdiction of an 
effective national government, where, we can assume, the Task 
Force believed that they should naturally be located (except for the 
special needs of Quebec). Thus the Task Force maps out a 
constitutional route under which Quebec would inevitably-albeit 
indirectly-become a province qui n'est pas du tout comme les 
autres. 
That is a fond but rather elusive hope. After all we are not 
talking about provinces like Prince Edward Island or about achieving 
uniformity in esoteric areas of common law. Rather we are talking 
about powerful provinces such as British Columbia or Alberta and 
attractive powers such as control over television. If the constitution 
were to make available jurisdiction over communication to each 
province, politicians and bureaucrats in Victoria and Edmonton 
would be sorely tempted by that prospect. They would likely be 
egged on by local citizens, who are not terribly enamoured of a CBC 
or CRTC which they see as dominated by Toronto or Montreal. We 
fear that the Task Force strategy of "asymmetric federalism" really 
is a recipe for decentralization to all of the major provinces, rather 
than a way-station for special status for Quebec alone. 
V. A Different Strategy. 
Our readers may be getting rather depressed from this litany. As fast 
as the Task Force throws up a new idea, we try to knock it down. 
Does that mean that we believe Canadian federalism is not really 
threatened? Do we have anything constructive to propose as an 
alternative? It is incumbent on us to make our commitments clear. 
26 Report, p. 87. 
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Obviously Canada does face a profound challenge to its 
continued existence. Rarely in the life of any country is a referendum 
conducted by the residents of a major region to determine whether 
they wish to leave. Clearly Canada is going to be one of the most 
decentralized federations in the world. In our judgment there must 
also be sufficient play in the constitutional joints to permit a discreet 
special status for Quebec, acknowledging the extraordinary cir-
cumstances of five million French Canadians beleaguered in the 
English-speaking sea of North America. 
Where we part company with the Task Force is in the 
assumption that the rewriting of the constitution is either a necessary 
or desirable means to that end. In our view, constitutional revision 
has nothing to do with the referendum and indeed may be 
counter-productive. Furthermore, to assume that we could ever agree 
on a completely revised constitution flies in the face of our every 
experience with constitutional negotiation, and exposes Canada to 
the risk of less change than may be desirable. Our history should 
teach us the virtues of negotiating changes in legislative policies 
attuned to practical problems rather than the staking of abstract 
jurisdictional claims, and the need for a finer sense of constitutional 
morality exhibited in the day-to-day behavior of all of the 
governments in our Canadian federation. 
Let us reflect for a moment on the dynamics of constitutional 
revision. In the first place, it was and it is totally unrealistic to try to 
revamp our constitution to defeat the Partiqu~bgcois referendum. 
Any significant constitutional changes require the consent of the 
government of Quebec City, politically if not legally. Why would 
Ren6 Lrvesque ever agree to meaningful reform which would only 
make his sovereignty-association option seem less attractive? We 
think it was Donald Smiley who once observed that it is rather 
difficult to write the peace treaty in the midst of the war! Nor is 
failure to fashion a new constitution just a neutral step. The entire 
exercise simply detracts even more from the legitimacy and worth of 
our existing document-the only constitution we now have. Then the 
Parti qu~bjcois can appeal for swing votes in the referendum 
campaign through subtle suggestions that a strong mandate is needed 
to show English Canada that Quebec wants truly radical surgery on 
the status quo, whether just inside or just outside the federal option. 
Of course, on the assumption that the federalist forces win the 
referendum, we could then settle down for some truly serious 
constitutional negotiating in the early Eighties. That is when our 
troubles may just begin. One difficulty we would face would be this. 
We have both a murky and an unwieldy procedure for constitutional 
amendment. The evolving consensus, tantamount to a constitutional 
convention, is that there must be agreement of all governments in 
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Canada, federal and provincial, about any major changes affecting 
the federal structure. That is a terribly difficult target to aim at: to 
achieve unanimous agreement from all eleven governments at one 
time, each of which has its own political setting and problems. For 
the past half-century we struggled for a new domestic amending 
procedure. As the fate of the Victoria Charter showed, Quebec will 
not agree to any formula until it has first secured the entire array of 
constitutional revisions it feels it needs. Alberta now seems to share 
that same view. The trouble is that we cannot secure anything like 





is the Catch-22 of constitutional reform in Canada 
right now. 
Suppose, perchance, that we did get a new amending formula. 
Even then consensus is unlikely. What is the atmosphere at the 
constitutional bargaining table? The participants are government 
leaders who are embroiled in the day-to-day conflicts of Canadian 
federalism. They will want to draft constitutional language that will 
clearly disentangle the problems that they have just experienced. We 
quoted earlier the kind of detailed language which the Task Force 
proposed for immigration. That pales by comparison with the 
frightening detail in the draft proposals exchanged by Ottawa and 
Alberta about natural resources and interprovincial trade. At the 
same time, the wording towards which these governments are 
groping is to be entrenched in a constitution. Thus our leaders know 
that any commitments they make will be well-nigh irrevocable. And 
their troubles in achieving consensus now simply reinforce their fear 
that they could never change that language in the future. Naturally 
each participant looks for wording which will protect it from all sorts 
of "hypothetical horribles" for an entire century. It is a wonder that 
we have secured any significant changes in the distribution of 
authority in our first century. That we have is the consequence not of 
constitutional change but of federal-provincial diplomacy in matters 
of public policy. 
This is the path we advocate for dealing with our Confederation 
discontents. New policies, new understandings, must be pursued 
along the modest avenue of legislative change, rather than ambitious 
27The Task Force weighs in with its variation on that time-honoured theme: an 
amendment formula which by-passes the provincial legislature in favour of a 
majority vote of the two Houses of Parliament (one of these a new House of the 
Provinces to be described shortly) plus ratification in a Canada-wide referendum 
requiring favourable majorities in each of our four regions: Quebec, Ontario, 
Western Canada, and the Maritimes. Understandably a lot of Canadians are 
fascinated with the subject of referenda these days. Still, whatever the merits of that 
device in principle, we question whether, in the existing climate, a formula for an 
end-run around a provincial government such as Quebec City or Edmonton really is 
the answer to that dilemma in Canadian constitutional change. 
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constitutional restructuring. There is no better example than 
immigration. This area poses abundant practical problems of public 
policy. From a functional standpoint, it is clear that all provinces 
have a legitimate concern about he impact of immigration on their 
local programmes. Quebec has a qualitatively distinct interest in the 
impact of newcomers on the francization of Quebec. At the same 
time, Ottawa must have an overriding authority for a variety of 
reasons, some of which we alluded to earlier. The sensible way to 
attack this problem area in federal-provincial relations is to work out 
an agreement which spells out the area of jurisdictional authority and 
policy judgment that each side will exercise to meet its needs. 
Because that bargain is to be expressed in a written agreement or 
statute, rather than in a constitution, consensus is relatively easy to 
achieve. Neither party need worry about making an irrevocable 
commitment, one which will foreclose its position about matters that 
it cannot now anticipate. Each party retains the right to go back to the 
bargaining table, and recognizes that the other may also be looking 
for revisions as positions change and adjustments are needed. 
This is precisely how jurisdictional conflicts in immigration 
were sorted out in the last five years. That same avenue has been 
generally followed in Canadian federalism for the past fifty years. 
While the language in the B.N.A. Act remains largely untouched, 
the real distribution of political power between Ottawa and the 
provinces has shifted dramatically. In the Forties and the Fifties the 
pendulum swung towards Ottawa. In the Sixties, it veered towards 
"special status" for Quebec, but in the Seventies the pendulum of 
power has swung towards all of the provinces. Perhaps the epitome 
of the entire process is the Established Programs Financing Act, 28 
whose fallout in our daily lives is now being seen in front-page 
stories in the newspapers about Medicare, eloquent testimony that no 
solution is a final solution. 
In all of the tumult and shouting heard in the federal-provincial 
arena, most Canadians miss the message of how remarkably 
successful our system of executive federalism can be. For example, 
following the shock of the OPEC oil price increase in 1973, and after 
some initial fumbling, Ottawa and the provinces did quite a good job 
(certainly by American standards) in cushioning the impact of higher 
energy costs throughout our regions, in distributing the huge 
revenues from natural resources, and in adjusting the equalization 
formula to that phenomenon. They performed that task best when the 
government leaders stopped exchanging salvos about abstract 
constitutional "rights" and got down to meeting the tangible needs 
of their citizens. Ironically, the most difficult hurdle was recently 
28 R.S.C., 1970, c. E-8. 
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erected by the Supreme Court of Canada in its CIGOL decision," 
when the court introduced new and unhappy constitutional doctrines. 
That put the touchy subject of natural resources squarely on the 
agenda for constitutional reform. As we might have anticipated, the 
terrain has proved much harder to explore from the air of 
constitutional abstraction, as it were, than on the ground of energy 
policy negotiations. 
And the latter is the environment in which a decent level of 
asymmetric federalism, of statut particulier for Quebec, could be 
nurtured. We agree with the Task Force that there are a number of 
places where Quebec's distinct heritage and culture do warrant larger 
areas of policy-making authority being located in Quebec City: 
immigration, communications, social policy, even international 
affairs. In a relatively low-key, low-visibility environment, those 
areas should be identified. Understandings can be reached tailored to 
the immediate problems that are faced and the immediate policies 
that are to be pursued. Ordinarily those agreements will last for a 
fixed term and will be open to renegotiation as events move on. Most 
important, once agreement is reached in an area such as immigra-
tion, there is no reason why the same package must be offered to 
Halifax, for instance, at least to anything like the same degree. No 
more, we might add than that Ottawa must sign the same agreement 
with Saskatchewan about off-shore resources as it does with 
Newfoundland. 
It seems to us that this is a far more sensible route to follow than 
the Task Force proposal of a new constitution which will offer an
"open sesame" to all the provinces to exercise these powers; in the 
hope-we think a faint hope-that the other provinces will use 
self-restraint to preserve a viable national polity. Under the strategy 
we envisage, Ottawa would be there as a counter-weight. Before a 
province secured additional authority in a particular area, it would 
have to persuade the federal government that it needed that authority 
to respond to special regional needs. 
No doubt all of that will look messily pragmatic, perhaps even 
offensive to the canonical mind, especially one as finely-honed as 
that of Pierre Trudeau, who did his best to dismantle the incipient 
arrangements for a special status for Quebec fashioned by Pearson in 
the Sixties. It will be unsatisfactory to those people in provincial 
capitals who want to spell out grand theories of constitutional 
principle-equating a renewed federalism with more power for 
them-and embody these in a new constitutional charter. As well, it 
will be argued that we place too much faith in Ottawa's receptivity to 
2 Canadian Industrial Gas and Oil Ltd. v. Government of Saskatchewan, 
[1978] 2 S.C.R. 545, 80 D.L.R. (3d) 449. 
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these agreements, in its willingness to cede its powers to the 
provinces if that seems desirable. As to the latter, we simply respond 
that if the government in Ottawa has a self-interest in preserving the 
unity of the country by healthy doses of regional autonomy, that will 
be considerably easier to achieve by these kinds of agreements than 
by writing a new constitution. The record of federal-provincial 
diplomacy in the last twenty years satisfies us that this task is 
perfectly feasible. As J. Alex Corry has so wisely pointed out, what 
the country needs now is a lot more day-to-day constitutional 
morality, and a benign neglect of constitutional legality.
30 
VI. Refurbishing Ottawa. 
The burden of our argument has been to stake out a position about the 
idealprocess of institutional change within Canadian federalism. We 
should add some observations about substance. Some additional 
decentralization does appear inevitable in Canada. In places that 
would be desirable. It is in order to avoid undue and irreparable 
devolution of authority to all the provinces that we would rather see 
such changes kept out of the constitutional arena as much as 
possible. But that kind of containment strategy will only work in the 
long run if our national institutions in Ottawa can somehow be 
refurbished and made more attractive. The arrangements that were 
fashioned in 1867 were modeled after Britain, a unitary state, and 
were put in place by a quasi-federal B.N.A. Act. The emergence of a 
new and positive role for government, and the way that has shaped 
our party system, our cabinet, our bureaucracy, and the position of 
our Prime Minister, have made these original structures increasingly 
unsuited to the thoroughly federal society which Canada has 
become. 31 
We are offered two paths out of that dilemma. One is creation of 
a new and different second chamber in Parliament. The most 
fashionable version is known as the House of the Provinces 
(endorsed by the Task Force under the sobriquet "Council of the 
Federation"). This body would give provincial governments a direct 
role in governing Ottawa, through a permanent delegation headed by 
a Cabinet minister, and on occasion by the Premier. Modeled on the 
West German Bundesrat, the House of the Provinces would wield a 
variety of suspensive and mandatory vetos, with different majorities 
required for different kinds of action. 32 The objective of that new 
30Corry, The Uses of a Constitution, in The Constitution and the Future of 
Canada (Law Society of Upper Canada, 1978). 
31Smiley, Structural Problems of Canadian Federalism, [1973] Can. Pub. Ad. 
326. 
32 Unlike West Germany, where a Constitutional Court resolves cases of conflict 
between the two chambers, the Task Force places its rather sanguine faith in a 
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institution would be to integrate our executive federalism into the 
parliamentary institutions in Ottawa in order to "insure that the 
views of provincial governments are taken into account before any 
central action [is taken] which might have an impact upon legitimate 
provincial concerns, thus inducing more harmonious federal-
provincial relations' '33 
Most emphatically we think that proposal is not a good idea for 
Canada at this time. One of us has devoted an entire article to 
developing the reasons why.31 We will not use the limited space 
allocated to us here to repeat that case. We do make these 
observations about the sketchy analysis by the Task Force: 
1. We believe that something of real value would be lost if the 
Senate were abolished. This is the role of "sober second-thought" 
by a legislative body, in contrast with the organ of executive 
federalism which the Task Force envisages for the House of the 
Provinces. The dimensions of that role are being seriously plumbed 
by the Senate in the last decade or two. We can think of few better 
tools than the Senate Committee on National Finances to alter 
Ottawa's image as a "remote, shambling bureaucracy". It is hardly 
likely that would be achieved in the "strengthened committee 
structure in the Commons", 35 shaped as that inevitably is by partisan 
concerns and party discipline in an elected House. Admittedly the 
Senate image of, in effect, "life peerages" should be refurbished, 
ideally through appointments for non-renewable terms of ten years, 
half appointed by provincial governments. With that caveat, a body 
that contains people like Messrs. Roblin, Manning, Robichaud, 
Lamontagne, Marchand, Forsey, and Goldenberg, should not be 
consigned to oblivion quite as casually as it is by the Task Force. 
2. We confess that we are more impressed by the virtues of our 
system of executive federalism than was the Task Force, who harp 
on its supposed deviation from "normal" political processes in a 
democracy. That is why we are so concerned about a constitutional 
change which might well undermine the process. The dynamics of. 
federal-provincial diplomacy require attention to practical problems 
and programmes, delicate negotiations to probe for priorities and 
trade-offs, and a federal government which often must switch roles 
from a party in interest to a conciliator-arbitrator between clashing 
regions (for instance, in the energy crisis we referred to earlier). 
permanent committee of the Speakers and selected members from both the House of 
Commons and the House of the Provinces, but suggests no way of resolving 
deadlocks. 
3 Report, p. 99. 
34 Weiler, Confederation Discontents and Constitutional Reform: the Case of 
the Second Chamber, 1979 Wright Lecture, to be published in the U. of Tor. L.J. 
31 Report, p. 99. 
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Even now the major breakthroughs and accomplishments more often 
than not take place at a private dinner at 24 Sussex Drive. Surely 
everything we have learned about bargaining, whether in labour 
relations or in federal-provincial relations, teaches us how much 
more difficult it is to fashion compromises in an open forum, with 
the inevitable temptation to posture for an audience back home. The 
Task Force itself seemed to recognize that when it expected that 
"much of the preparatory work for the meetings of the Council 
would take place through its committees". 3 6That is exactly how the 
German Bundesrat operates. Committees of civil servants stationed 
in Bonn do the negotiations and reach the compromises which are 
ratified by the politicians in the Bundesrat. How that model would 
improve the normal political process of parliamentary democracy in 
Canada is far from clear to us. 
3. Finally, we are more worried than the Task Force that a 
House of the Provinces could be a recipe for partisan obstruction in 
Ottawa, thus weakening even further the legitimacy of our national 
political institutions. 31 We are also concerned that this idea has been 
put on the agenda in addition to, rather than in lieu of, the expansion 
of the independent jurisdiction of the provinces. Perhaps an apt, 
colloquial translation of the package is that the provinces will say to 
Ottawa: "What's mine is mine, and what's yours should be mine as 
well!" We are dubious that that is the most sensible gambit in our 
current straits. 
That is not an objection which can be lodged against a final 
issue on the constitutional agenda-electoral reform. Change here 
would respond to a significant, tangible problem within Canadian 
federalism, and can be achieved without opening the Pandora's Box 
of the constitution. The Task Force endorses that idea, the first of 
our public reports to do so. 
36 Ibid., p. 98. 
37 One intriguing feature of the Report seems to recognize the potential for 
obstruction in a House of the Provinces of desirable national programmes. The Task 
Force proposes that any use of the federal spending power in areas of provincial 
jurisdiction must be ratified in the House of the Provinces. But that is done only after 
the federal government is given an explicit power of its own to make unconditional 
payments to the provinces. That power is the lynch-pin of the equalization 
programme which the Commissioners believe is indispensable to an effective and 
equitable economic union. Earlier in the Report, the Commissioners intone that 
"federal systems are generally more stable and more effective than confederal 
systems in which the central institutions consist of delegates of the component state 
governments .... Furthermore, a crucial disadvantage of the confederal form of 
union . . . is the difficulty such systems have in achieving an effective redistribution 
of resources to correct disparities among constituent units". Report, p. 82. 
Accepting the cogency of that observation, the Task Force carefully insulates the 
federal operation of the equalization programme from scrutiny and possible 
obstruction in the House of the Provinces, the very confederal-type body they 
propose to clamp on the rest of governmental action in Ottawa. 
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Simply put, the problem we face is the disintegration of our 
national party system. The Conservatives traditionally win a tiny 
number of seats in Quebec (the NDP none at all) while the Liberals 
are now faring equally poorly in the West. That disparity reached its 
nadir in our most recent election in 1979, when the Tories won only 
two of seventy-five seats in Quebec, and the Liberals just three of 
seventy-seven in the West (two of these by razor-thin majorities). 
Neither major party caucus can remotely lay claim to being 
representative nationwide. This fact places the operation of national 
government under serious strain in Canada, a fragmented community 
at the best of times. 
Those visible indices of party support in a region are somewhat 
deceiving. Building on the classic study by Allan Cairns, scholars 
have shown how our electoral system distorts the true distribution of 
party allegiance by region.38 For example, the Liberals have 
consistently polled more than twenty-five percent of the vote in 
Western Canada, the Tories more than twenty percent in Quebec. 
But our single-member, "first past the post" electoral system just as 
consistently translates these sizeable numbers of votes into just a tiny 
handful of seats. The resulting disease, once it afflicts party 
caucuses, tends to be progressively debilitating. The fundamental 
actors in a parliamentary system are the party teams in the 
Commons. A caucus with little or no representation in Quebec or 
Western Canada may lose touch with the distinctive feelings and 
attitudes of these regions. If this lasts long enough, the caucus may 
not even be able to assimilate a sudden windfall gain of members: to 
wit, the difficulties of the Conservative caucus with the influx of 
Quebec members from the Diefenbaker landslide in 1958. Represen-
tational deficiencies become self-perpetuating as party organizations 
decide to expend their scarce campaign resources-not just money, 
but also the leader's time and planks in the party platform-to 
concentrate the party's appeal in those regions whose extra votes 
have a realistic chance of yielding more seats. We have reached the 
ominous position in 1979 in which the Conservatives, while forming 
the government, have actually dropped below fourteen percent in the 
popular vote in Quebec, almost beyond the reach of a proportional 
representation remedy! 
The latter is of course the obvious medicine. Nor need we 
dispense with our traditional Anglo-Saxon system of local constitu-
ency ties between members and electorate. We need simply add to 
3 See Cairns, The Electoral System and Party System in Canada: 1921-1965 
(1968), 1 Can. J. of Pol. Sc. 55; Smiley, Federalism and the Legislative Process in 
Canada, in Nielson and MacPherson, eds, The Legislative Process in Canada (1978), 
p. 73; Irvine, Alternative Electoral Systems, in The Political Economy of 
Confederation (1979), p. 269. 
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that system a number of Commons seats-the Task Force proposes 
sixty-which should be filled from national party lists in proportion 
to their popular vote. That way, each region would effectively be 
guaranteed representation in the party teams which, in the final 
analysis, are the central actors in our system of parliamentary 
democracy. 
That notion has this additional virtue. It can be accomplished 
without raising all of the hackles that are customary in debates about 
shifts in the balance of power between Ottawa and the provinces. It 
does not have to be negotiated and agreed to by all eleven 
governments. The difficulties with the constitutional amendment 
formula can all be finessed. The issue can be debated in Parliament 
by MP's who have had first-hand experience with the election 
system, with the role of the MP in Ottawa, and with the distorted 
make-up of their party caucuses. If, as we hope, this is an idea whose 
time has come, it can be accomplished in one stroke by an Act of 
Parliament. Nor could the Parti qu~bcois decently lodge any 
objection. After all, electoral reform is an idea they have been toying 
with for Quebec itself.3 9 
It is fair to observe that he Task Force endorses this idea with a 
rather different emphasis than we do. Indeed the Commissioners, 
rather than prescribe like a physician who retains hope for the return 
of his patient to full health, appear to have approached the party 
caucuses somewhat like a mortician who applies his cosmetic skills 
to disguise a corpse from the ravages of a terminal disease that has 
run its course. A dose of proportional representation can dress up a 
party caucus with some semblance of national representativeness. 
The road to good health requires considerably more. It may be a 
matter, for example, of considering a variation on the Task Force 
proposal advanced by Donald Smiley. The candidates awarded 
Smiley's provincial seats would be elected not with reference to their 
position on a party list but by virtue of having been the strongest 
runner-up in the province's electoral districts. It follows that the 
provincial MP's from the regions in which a party is weakest start 
with at least some proven vote-getting ability as a base from which to 
resurrect local party fortunes. Does such a base promise more 
likelihood of recovery than high ranking on a party list that might be 
entirely composed of individuals with impeccable personal creden-
tials but no aptitude for electoral campaigns? 
To debate the point is interesting, but is rendered academic in 
the context of the Task Force proposals. The provincial MP's who 
" In April 1979 the Hon. Robert Burns, Minister of State in the Government of 
Quebec, issued a green paper on the reform of the electoral system, entitled One 
Citizen, One Vote. 
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find their way into the reformed House of Commons are viewed by 
the Commissioners as anything but the workhorses in what must be a 
political bootstrap operation if a party's regional weaknesses are to 
be other than disguised. Instead, these MP's will find waiting for 
them the very functions of legislative refinement and investigation 
that the Commissioners' Council of the Federation forced them to 
export from the upper house. Why? Because these MP's are free, in 
the Commissioners' words, "of constituency problems which 
require, rightly, a great deal of attention". 40 Apparently a region in 
which party representation has long been deficient does not 
constitute a set of constituency problems, or so the Task Force would 
have us believe. 
There is no better illustration than this of how the Task Force 
has let its sense of constitutional inventiveness triumph over its sense 
of priorities. They jot down proportional representation on a laundry 
list of fully seventy-five constitutional recommendations, many of 
which, like their revamped upper and lower Houses, would not live 
very comfortably together. We endorse that proposal with quite a 
different emphasis. We would use the limited momentum for 
renewal of Canadian federalism on this single important reform in 
Ottawa: to accomplish a manageable improvement in the representa-
tiveness of our major party caucuses, and thus to repair the most 
serious flaw in the capacity of our central institutions to contribute to 
national unity. For it is the House of Commons-not the Monarchy, 
the Governor General, the Senate, the Supreme Court, even the legal 
status of our fundamental rights-which we must strengthen in order 
to enhance the legitimacy of our national seat of government in 
Ottawa. 
VII. Conclusion. 
In retrospect we have been somewhat hard on the Unity Task Force. 
Nothing it says is outside the mainstream of current analysis of 
Canadian federalism. In many respects the Report is the most 
impressive of the lot. 
Still, it is for that very reason that detailed scrutiny of this 
document is useful in exposing the set of mind which is widespread 
among our constitutional reformers. Canada is enveloped in twin 
crises of Qudbgcois nationalism and Western Canadian alienation. 
Our constitutional arrangements, centered in Ottawa, are stifling 
these legitimate aspirations. Only massive surgery on the B.N.A. 
Act can (and will) cure these ailments. It is concerning the 
prescription that we cannot be too critical. We think it is a mistake. 
There are inherent limits in the degree of constitutional change 
which can be digested at any one time. Canadians are not starting 
40 Report, p. 106. 
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afresh (as were the Americans in the late 1780's). We are not 
rebuilding a polity devastated by war (as were the West Germans in 
the late 1940's). We have had a century of history, practices, and 
understandings in what we dare say ordinary Canadians feel has been 
a relatively successful experiment in government, its admitted flaws 
notwithstanding. Even if it were desirable-which we do not think 
for a minute-it simply is not feasible to rebuild our constitution 
from scratch. 
Undeniably, there are powerful centrifugal forces abroad in our 
country, gnawing at the roots of the Canadian fabric. To the extent 
that our political structures are out of joint, and new power-sharing 
arrangements are needed (especially with Quebec) these will most 
sensibly and most likely be accomplished through Canada's modern 
invention of federal-provincial diplomacy: in the form of detailed, 
tangible agreements for sharing power in specific theatres of 
government action. 4' Meanwhile the aptitude and the appetite for 
outright institutional innovation is a scarce resource in any ongoing 
nation. For the moment we would invest that capital in a single 
important reform: partial proportional representation in the House of 
Commons. 
41 See McWhinney, Quebec and the Constitution: 1960-1978 (1979), p. 147. 
